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..tHE FEDERAL RESERVE Bank of New York,
acting as an agent of the U.S. Treasury, occa-
sionally intervenes in foreign exchange markets.
These actions, which involve the purchase or
sale of assets denominated in foreign currencies
in exchange for dollars, are intended to affect
the exchange rate by altering the asset supplies
denominated in one currency relative to that of
another, Intervention can he directed to a varie-
ty of objectives including a change in the level
of the dollar exchange rate, a reduction in the
volatility of the dollar’s value around some level,
or an adjustment of the Federal Reserve’s hold-
ings of assets denominated in foreign currencies
relative to its holdings of dollar-denominated
assets.
This article explains the mechanics of foreign
exchange intervention for people who are not
s1ecialists in this area of study and identifies
avenues through which sterilized intervention
conceivably could affect the exchange rate, It
then describes and analyzes daily data recently
released by the Federal Reserve Board on its in-
tervention activities in the Deutsche mark (DPI)
and Japanese yen for the period 1985-89. Be-
cause these data had been confidential and simi-
lar data from the Bundeshank and Bank of
Japan still are not publicly available, investigat-
ing the effects of intervention on the exchange
rate has been difficult for at least two reasons,
First, without hat-cl data on the activities of all
central banks involved, statistical tests and infer-
ences require assumptions about the unknown
actions of some participants. Second, even with
complete data, stating an hypothesis about the
effectiveness of intervention is subject to fur-
ther assumptions about the unknown objectives
of the central banks involved.
Recognizing these limitations, the last section
of this paper nonetheless attempts to test sever-
al hypotheses about the effectiveness of interven-
tion.’ While offering no firm conclusions on its
effectiveness during the period examined, the
1See Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) or Weber (1986) for
a survey of issues and evidence on the effectiveness of in-
tervention,newly-released Fed data and some qualitative
data on the timing of foreign central bank inter-
ventions give a flavor of the frequency and scale
of these activities, And, under certain assump-
tions, these data also identify some circumstances
under which intervention had statistically sig-
nificant effects on the DM/dollar and yen/dollar
exchange rates,
An exchange rate is simply the jelative price
of two currencies, So, for example, if two
Deutsche marks can be exchanged for $1, the
dollar price of 1DM is $50; conversely, the DPI
price of $1 is 2DM. Just like any relative price
in the marketplace, the value of the exchange
rate is determined by the interaction of the sup-
ply and demand for the two currencies,
One reason for intervention is to avoid ex-
change rates that are higher (or lower) than
some perceived “correct” level, which can have
deleterious short-run effects on a country’s in-
ternational trade.~To see how foreign exchange
intervention might be used to affect the level of
the exchange rate, refer to figure i. panel A
shows the markets for the dollar and DM, using
an exchange rate of 2DM per $1 (1DM 8.50)
as an initial market equilibrium. This equilibri-
um is shown by points A and A’ at the intersec-
tions of the respective supply and demand
curves in the two markets,
Without developing a theoretical model of the
variables that may cause a change in either the
supply or demand for either currency—and,
hence, cause a change in the exchange rate—
assume that the demand for dollars by German
citizens rises, shifting D~rightward to D~and
creating a new equilibrium in the market for
dollars at point B.3 Here, the new DM price of
$1 has risen to 2,5, which implies that, for an
equilibrium to exist in the market for DM, the
dollar price of one DM must have fallen to 8.40
(1/2,5). A change in the equilibrium price of dol-
lars will cause a corresponding change in the
equilibrium price for DM because changes in
supply (demand) of one currency necessarily
will cause corresponding changes in the de-
mand (supply) of the other currency to reach
the new equilibrium price in that market. In
other words, if the increased German demand
for dollars raises its price to 2.5 DM, then Ger-
man citizens have increased the supply of DM
they are willing to offer for sale in the market
for any given value of the exchange rate, In-
deed, the DM supply curve (S%~,)must shift out-
ward until, at its new position (~h~,1), the dollar
price of DM has fallen to the new equilibrium
value of 8.40,
If this change in the exchange rate were
deemed undesirable by policymakers, then the
two central banks that control the supplies of
dollars and DPI could alter these supplies to re-
store the original exchange rate of 2DM per dol-
lar, Though central banks often attempt to act
jointly, each reinforcing the action of the other,
assume for present purposes that the Federal
Reserve embarks on intervention alone.~If the
Fed’s intention is to restoi-e the initial equilibri-
um, the figure shows that it must increase the
supply of dollars to a position at S~so that the
intersection with D~ occurs at the original
equilibrium exchange rate of 2DM per dollar
(point C). The Fed would try to accomplish this
by purchasing DM in the open market in ex-
change for dollars which, by withdrawing DM
from circulation, would move the DPI supply
2Purchasing a foreign good requires the exchange of the
home currency for an amount of foreign currency equal to
the foreign price of the good, so that changes in the ex-
change rate can affect the amount of goods one country
exports and another imports. Indeed, many observers who
perceive the persistent U.S. deficits in merchandise trade
as a problem have recommended policies to reduce the
dollar’s value, Although a reduction in the dollar’s nominal
value is potentially a short-run stimulant to exports, only
changes in its real value (nominal value adjusted for price
level differences across countries) will have a permanent
effect on exports. See Batten and Belongia (1984) for fur-
ther discussion of the distinction between real and nominal
exchange rates and the consequences of this distinction in
debates about exchange rates and trade flows,
3Throughout, we will focus on the effects of changes in
relative money supplies alone as the main determinants of
exchange rate changes. This is not in itself controversial in
theoretical discussions of exchange rate determination,
although economists have been unable to agree on other
elements of a theoretical model to represent exchange rate
behavior, Other factors typically incorporated in such
models are differentials between domestic and foreign real
growth and between domestic and foreign interest rates.
This potential role for interest rate differentials is discussed
briefly in the appendix. For discussions of models of ex-
change rate determination see Krueger (1983), For a sur-
vey of some empirical issues, see Mussa (1979).
4This assumption is made for ease of exposition. Balbach
(1978) presents an extensive list of ways that intervention
may be conducted by involving the U,S, Treasury’s Ex-
change Stabilization Fund, the Federal Reserve and for-
eign central banks. For a specific example of how the
Bundesbank might act to support the value of the DM, see
Batten and Ott (1984).34
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Qscurve back to its original position at S~.In-
creasing the quantity of dollars in circulation
relative to PM will reduce the dollar’s value in
terms of PM. All other factors the same, this
simple example shows how, by altering the rela-
tive quantities of any two currencies in circula-
tion, central banks might be able to change the
prevailing level of the exchange rate. Precisely
how the Fed would conduct this operation is
discussed in a later section.
Another point, which will be developed more
fully, needs to be mentioned here. As the exam-
ple shows, the exchange rate changes because
the supply of dollars has changed relative to the
supply of PM. Direct intervention is not neces-
sary, however, to achieve this result. Instead, a
central bank can affect the exchange rate (by
design or as a side effect of actions directed to
other goals) by changing its money supply dur-
ing normal domestic open market operations
and without any sales or purchases of foreign-
denominated assets. Conversely, some central
banks, such as the Bundesbank and Swiss Na-
tional Bank, conduct their domestic monetary
policy through transactions in the foreign ex-
change market rather than through transactions
in a domestic credit market in the manner of
the Fed’s purchases and sales of US. Treasury
securities,~Therefore, if intervention is to be
viewed as an independent tool of monetary poli-
cy, it must be able to alter the exchange rate
without affecting the operations of domestic
monetary policy.
lrfle.rt entio-.n ant.! . I1~Y :tI.rlgt: ~
In addition to altering the level of the ex-
change rate, another reason for intervention is
to dampen the volatility of exchange rate move-
ments. Though the level of the exchange rate
might not change much over time, some people
believe that erratic short-run fluctuations in the
exchange rate can be destabilizing. For example,
people in two countries may have contracts to
buy or sell a good or service on an agreed date
at an agreed price. A random fluctuation in the
exchange rate just before the contract date will
inflict unexpected losses on the buyer whose
currency has depreciated (because he must give
up more units of his domestic currency to get
the same number of units of the foreign curren-
cy to pay the seller of the good)- Conversely,
the buyer whose currency has appreciated will
realize windfall gains. To the extent these ef-
fects occur and are thought to be unpredicta-
ble, the exchange rate fluctuations behind them
may impede international trade as exporters
and importers perceive such transactions to be
risky.°Indeed, the perception that exchange
rate volatility impedes trade flows is the ration-
ale for the current European Monetary System
(EMS) and for the planned move to a single cur-
rency in the European Community (EC) by
11199.’
To see how intervention can reduce or elimi-
nate volatility, consider panel B of figure 1. For
simplicity, both panels refer only to the market
for dollars- Referring to the left panel, assume
there are random movements in the demand
for dollars between positions at D~and D~.For
a given supply of dollars, the PM/$ exchange
rate will fluctuate between 2.0 and 2.5. To off-
set these fluctuations, as shown in the right
panel, the Federal Reserve could intervene to in-
crease the supply of dollars to S~when the de-
mand for dollars rises to D~, and intervene to
reduce the supply of dollars to S~when the de-
mand for dollars falls to D~.Abstracting from
real-world problems such as adjustment lags,
lack of information, changes in the supply or
demand of DM, and other factors that may in-
hibit exchange rate smoothing, such a strategy
conceivably could keep the DM18 exchange rate
at a value of 2.0 as it moved between the sup-
ply and demand equilibria represented by
points A and C. The equilibrium at point B,
where the exchange rate rises to 2.5, would be
eliminated by successful intervention. Presuma-
bly, trade would increase if exporters and im-
porters became convinced that intervention
eliminated the risk of an exchange rate change.
5The foreign exchange market is used in these cases be-
cause the government securities market does not have the
depth necessary for central bank open market operations.
°Buyersand sellers can protect themselves from these loss-
es by hedging their transactions; see Williams (1986) for
more detail on how hedging of foreign exchange risk can
be accomplished. Rolnick and Weber (1989) report that the
costs of hedging against this sort of exchange rate volatility
range from 0.5 percent to 3 percent of total foreign sales.
For the U.S. in 1989, this would have put the costs of hedg-
ing exchange rate risk between $6.5 billion and $39 billion.
‘The EMS was founded in 1979 to keep bilateral exchange
rates among EC currencies within relatively narrow
bands—(+) or (—) 2 114 percent of an agreed level was
typical for most currencies. For an overview of the mechan-
ics of this system, see Ungereç et al. (1986); for a critique,
see Belongia (1988) or Meltzer (1990).~:iJQ’f’~t:flH~f
In the two examples of intervention just dis-
cussed, the value of the exchange rate was al-
tered only if there was a change in one money
supply relative to the other. Moreover, these ex-
amples assumed that only the Federal Reserve
was intervening. Complications would arise if,
on the one hand, one or more other central
banks reinforced the Fed’s activities by selling
dollars and purchasing DM while the Fed was
trying to reduce the dollar’s value against DM,
On the other hand, other central banks could
have subverted the Fed’s intervention goals had
they made equal and offsetting purchases of
dollars and sales of DM. Generally speaking, in
the presence of large and highly developed
world markets for the major currencies, the ex-
change rate between any two ultimately de-
pends on the world supplies and demands for
them rather than on the limited actions of just
one central bank.
Although the case of two central banks work-
ing at cross-purposes may seem unlikely, in-
dividual central banks often take two, largely
offsetting, actions when they intervene in ex-
change markets. This “sterilized” intervention
occurs when a central bank undertakes an open
market operation in its domestic market that ex-
actly offsets the effects of its actions in the for-
eign currency market on the domestic money
supply. Such intervention is called sterilized be-
cause the two actions, on net, produce no
change in the domestic money supply. The
problem, of course, is that, without affecting
the money supply, there is presumably no
avenue for sterilized intervention to affect the
exchange rate.8 Understanding these procedures
will be important to the statistical tests that fol-
low because Federal Reserve interventions are
routinely sterilized.°
To understand sterilized intervention and the
mechanics behind the shifts in the supply of
dollars shown in figures tA and 1B, consider
the simplified Federal Reserve balance sheet
shown in figure 2. Before any intervention oc-
curs, the Fed’s assets are U.S. Treasury securi-
ties and its liabilities are the reserves of the U.S.
banking system; these two items are the sources
and uses of the monetary base which, in turn,
is the basis of the U.S. money supply. If the Fed
wanted to increase the U.S. money supply, it
would make an open market purchase of Treas-
ury securities from U.S. banks and pay for
them by crediting the reserve balances of these
banks at the Fed. Thus, both the assets and lia-
bilities sides of the Fed’s balance sheet would in-
crease. A simplified Federal Reserve balance
sheet showing the effects of injecting reserves
into the US, banking system is depicted in the
top panel of figure 2.
Now consider what happens when the Fed de-
cides to engage in foreign exchange interven-
tion. Say that at 4:30 am. New York time (10:30
am, in Frankfurt, Germany), the Fed and the
Bundesbank agree that they should try to
reduce the value of the dollar by some amount.
To do so, the U.S. money supply must be in-
creased relative to the German money supply.
As a matter of practice, the Fed could purchase
DM-denominated deposits that large U.S. banks
hold w-ith German banks and pay for them in
the same way the Fed would conduct a normal
open-market operation: by crediting the reserve
accounts of the U.S. banks that sold their DM
deposits. These transactions are shown in the
two left-hand accounts in the lower panel of
figure 2.
The process does not end there, however.
When the drafts made against the PM accounts
of U.S. banks are presented by the Fed to the
Bundesbank for clearing, this transaction adds
the DM deposits of the Fed to the Bundesbank’s
liabilities but reduces the reserves of the Ger-
man banking system; this is shown in the right-
hand columns in the lower panel of figure 2.
This draining decline in reserves reduces the
German money supply. Conversely, the U.S.
money supply rises because this transaction in-
creases both the assets and liabilities sides of the
°Aquestion arises, in the context of the simple supply and
demand mechanics of exchange rate determination, why a
central bank would engage in sterilized intervention. Two
arguments have been advanced along these lines. A re-
cent one, with some empirical support, is that such activi-
ties provide a valuable “signal” to participants in the
foreign exchange market about the future course of mone-
tary policy and its likely effects on future values of the ex-
change rate; see Dominguez (1988, 1990). Another
argument, for which the empirical support has been mixed,
is that foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substi-
tutes and that, by altering their relative supplies through
sterilized intervention, the exchange rate can be changed
by affecting the differential between domestic and foreign
interest rates. For a general review of theory and evidence,
see Henderson (1984).
9See Balbach (1978).Figure 2
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Fed’s balance sheet. If no further action is
taken, these actions would reflect unsterilized
intervention because they alter the relative sup-
plies of dollars and DM.
Under current practices, however, the action
made at 4:30 am, New York time will be
reversed at 11:30 am, when the Open Market
Desk of the New York Fed conducts its domestic
open market operation for the day. To achieve
its domestic reserve objectives, the Open Market
Desk assembles projections each day of elements
of the Fed’s balance sheet. Thus, the staff will
note that the foreign exchange activity of sever-
al hours ago had the effect of increasing the
reserves of the U.S. banking system and will be
reflected as an increase in the monetary base,
Consider, for example, that the Open Market
Desk of the New York Fed would have deter-
mined—absent any intervention—that the Sys-
tem’s domestic objectives for that day would be
met without an open market operation. If the
intervention activity caused a $1 billion increase
in the monetary base, the domestic Desk, noting
this effect, would undertake a $1 billion sale of
U.S. Treasury securities to reduce reserves.
Thus, the desire to achieve its domestic mone-
tary objective has led to actions that cancel the
domestic effects on the money supply of the
earlier intervention. Indeed, because offsetting
domestic open market operations leave bank
reserves, the monetary base, and, hence, the
supply of dollars unchanged, the only effect of
sterilized intervention is a change in the compo-
sition of the Fed’s balance sheet. Its holdings of
foreign-denominated assets increase and its
holdings of U.S. ‘treasury securities fall, but the
domestic money supply is unchanged. (See the
appendix for a more detailed discussion of how
other channels might operate and how sterilized
intervention, in fact, may not be “sterilized” in
the conventional use of the term.)
These mechanics highlight the fact that, if a
central bank wishes to change the nominal
value of its currency, it need not intervene in
the foreign exchange market at all. Instead, be-
cause relative money supplies determine to a
large extent the relative values of the two cur-
rencies in question, domestic open market oper-
ations alone can have the same effect on the
exchange rate as unsterilized intervention.1o Ac-
10Weber (1986) makes this point in much greater detail.cording to the simple theory outlined in the
preceding section, a central bank wishing to
reduce its currency’s nominal value need only
engineer a rate of money growth faster than
the growth rate of the money supply in the
other country. In this context, the very rapid
growth rate of Ml in the United States from
May 1985 through December 1986 has been in-
terpreted by some economists as an attempt by
the Federal Reserve to reduce the dollar’s value
without engaging in any substantial intervention
activity.” Conversely, an increase in the dollar’s
value can be achieved by engineering a relative-
ly slower growth rate of the money supply.12
This suggests that exchange market intervention
may be motivated by a central bank’s desire to
give signals to market participants or to alter
the relative shares of domestic and foreign as-
sets on its balance sheet, rather than to alter
the level of the exchange rate directly.
,
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Figures 3-6 provide a general reference to
movements in the PM/S and yen/S exchange
rates and the scale of U.S. intervention during
the period 1985-89; neither the Fed nor the U.S.
Treasury undertook any intervention in 1986.
Negative values in the bottom portions of these
figures indicate a sale of dollars—that is, a pur-
chase of the foreign currency by the U.S.
authorities. Although matching exchange rate
and intervention data in this manner offers the
temptation of making inferences about cause
and effect, the discussion that follows will indi-
cate that this strategy is not warranted,”
To put figures 3A and 3B, showing exchange
rate and intervention data for 1985 in the proper
context, note that the dollai’s value peaked
against both the yen and PM in February, then
fell by more than 6.5 percent against both cur-
rencies by the end of August. Dut-ing the
weekend of September 22, 1985, the now-
famous Plaza Accord was agreed upon in a
meeting of Finance Ministers of the G-5 coun-
tries at the Plaza Hotel in New York. In effect,
this agreement pledged support for coordinated
intervention to reduce the dollar’s value.”
In contrast to the press coverage of the time,
the data show, first, that declines in the dollar’s
value between February and September occurred
with little or no intervention by the Federal
Reserve or the Treasury. Figures 3A and 3B also
show that the United States limited its interven-
tion activities to a period of 34 days immediate-
ly following the Plaza agreement. Finally, U.S.
cumulative purchases of yen and PM during this
34-day period amounted to only $1.44 billion
and $1.86 billion (equivalent), respectively.
‘these figures can be contrasted with daily
volume in the New York market alone that
averaged $129 billion per day in April 1989.”
‘I’herefore, even if the comparable trading
volumes of the London and Tokyo markets are
ignored, (which would raise total daily volume
to in excess of $400 billion) the actual scale of
intervention typically was a trivial share of total
volume in the foreign exchange market during
this period.
The data for 1987 in figures 4A and 4B also
highlight at least two interesting features of re-
cent U.S. interventions. The first is that the
dominant activity switched from purchasing for-
eign currencies and selling dollars—which
would tend to reduce the dollar’s value—to sell-
ing foreign exchange and buying dollars—
actions consistent with supporting the dollar’s
value, The figures also show that this interven-
tion occurred over a period of steady declines
in the dollar’s value. Indeed, between the time
of the Plaza Accord in September 1985 and
March 1987, when a new burst of intervention
occurred, the dollar’s value fell from 231.90 yen
and 2.73 PM to 151.70 yen and 1.83 PM.
Although no rationale was made public for each
intervention, the data for early 1987 are consis-
tent with the view that U.S. Treasury officials
believed further declines in the value of the do)-
lar below these levels should be r-esisted,
The Louvre Accord, reached on February 20,
1987, marks a second interesting period. This
agreement brought together the G-7 Finance
‘‘See, for example, Bernanke and Mishkin (1991).
‘2Bordo and Schwartz (1990, pp. 5-6) provide evidence on
relative rates of Ml growth in the United States, Germany
and Japan and corresponding movements in the DM18 and
yen/S exchange rates since 1985.
“Briefly, if intervention is directed to resisting exchange rate
changes, the coincidence of a large intervention and a
change in the exchange rate would be evidence on the
failure of intervention.
14For a critique of intervention since the Plaza Accord specif-
ically, see Bordo and Schwartz (1990).
“See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1989)./
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecMinisters to agree on intervention activities but,
in contrast to Plaza, the Louvre Accord directed
their attention to stabilizing exchange rates
around then-current levels rather than changing
the level itself.’°As with Plaza, the United
States followed this agreement with an initial
burst of activity in March, the month following
the agreement; during a period of 53 days, the
U.S. authorities sold an equivalent of $4,088 mil-
lion in yen and $782 million in PM. The United
States did not intervene again in any concerted
way until December when the dollar’s value
was approaching record lows for the postwar
era. Even in this case, however, intervention by
the United States had ceased by January 1988.
One is left to speculate, then, whether the ex-
change rate levels at this point were consistent
with the target zones established at the Louvre
meeting in February or whether the United
States had decided for some other reason to
limit its intervention activities.1
7 The remaining
data for 1988, shown in figures 5A and SB, rev-
eal several episodes of intervention on both
sides of the market: selling foreign exchange for
dollars in the spring and fall and buying PM
against dollars in the summer.
The data for 1989 (figures GA and GB), in con-
trast to the previous figures, show relatively
persistent and consistent intervention against
both the yen and PM. For the year as a whole,
the United States bought, cumulatively,
$10,925.80 million and $11,130.50 million
(equivalent) of yen and PM, respectively; in-
deed, the United States purchased more PM
and yen in 1989 than it did in the years 1985-88
combined. At the same time, the dollar’s value
moved in different directions against the two
currencies, rising from 123.60 to 143.80 against
the yen (+ 16 percent) and falling from 1.76 to
1.69 against PM (—4 percent). Although it is in~-
possible to prove the counterfactual argument
that the dollar’s value would have changed even
more without this intervention, its efficacy may
be questioned if intervening in the same man-
ner against two different currencies is associat-
ed with appreciations against one and deprecia-
tions against the other. Certainly this diverging
pattern suggests the influence of some other
factor on the exchange rate beyond intervention.
As noted in the introduction, the story of in-
tervention is incomplete without looking at com-
parable data on the activities of the Bundesbank
and Bank of Japan. Although data on the value
of foreign central bank actions are not available,
it is possible to identify days on which foreign
central banks intervened. In making partitions
of the data set, it is assumed that, at a mini-
mum, these central banks were not working
against Federal Reserve actions. In other words,
we assume that on the days the Fed intervened,
the Bundesbank and Bank of Japan either did
nothing or they conducted a complementary in-
tervention that would reinforce the effect of the
Fed’s actions.
It also should be noted that it is impossible, or
at least very difficult, to refute the counterfac-
tual argument—that the exchange rate would
have changed without intervention, Indeed,
without knowing the reasons for central bank
actions, intervention may be motivated primar-
ily by a desire to resist—rather than cause—
changes in the exchange rate. Because this pos-
sibility is a hypothesis that cannot be tested, we
will assume that, in the absence of intervention,
the exchange rate would not have changed. We
also will assume that the purpose of intec’ven-
tion was to make the exchange rate move in a
certain direction even though a large change on
the day of intervention might indicate the failux-e
of an action that was intended to prevent a
change in the exchange rate.
In view of the earlier discussion and these
two assumptions, several hypotheses merit test-
ing. ‘I’he first is that the average absolute change
in the exchange rate on days when the Fed in-
tervenes alone should not be different from the
changes in the exchange rate when no interven-
tion occurs. This test is based on the earlier dis-
cussion of sterilized intervention, which predicted
that its failure to change relative money sup-
plies also should leave the exchange rate un-
affected. A second test is motivated by the
practice of the Bundeshank not to sterilize (at
least not completely) its intervention; thus, on
‘°Funabashi,(1988).
‘‘Target zones establish upper and lower bounds for the ex-
change rate. Typically, the exchange rate is tree to vary
within the established range but central banks pledge to
engage in coordinated intervention if the exchange rate
begins to move outside of the range.Table 1
Mean Changes in the Absolute Value of the DM/$ Exchange
Rate (*100)
Year X1 (n) X2 (n) X3 (n) X4 (n)
1985 1.00(7) 136(32) 305(12) 205(188)
1986 --- 124(15) -- - 1.25(226)
1987 1 21(10) 1.01 (19) 1.27 (20) 0.77(194)
1988 0.90 (4) 0.87 (42) 1 43 (30) 0.67(185)
1989 076 (20) 084(11) 099 (33) 091 (61)
All years o92(41) 1 07(119) 1.45 (95) 118(834)
Test Statistics for Equality of Mean Changes (Absolute Values)
Year x1=i4 ; *~=i~ i~—*~;=i~ x2=x3
1985 1 59 2 19* t75 0.86 1 41 2.39*
1986 - 0.04 -- - . -- ---
1987 175 1.26 284* 067 016 0.87
1988 069 176 532* 0.07 091 2M2
1989 075 028 0.49 028 097 0.52
All years 128 0.95 1.89 092 1.88 214*
Subscripts to Xs and nufi hypotheses indicate the following
= tnterventton only by Federal Reserve
X2
= intervention only by BundeSbank
— Intervention by both the Federal Reserve and Bundesbank
no intervention by eithercentral bank
*= Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
days when a foreign central bank intervenes rate changes.” On one hand, if intervention is
alone, the average absolute change in the cx- associated with larger average daily changes,
change rate should be significantly larger than the variance of these changes might rise as
on days when no intervention occurs.” The rca- well. On the other hand, if the purpose of inter-
son, of course, is that unsterilized intervention vention is to reduce daily volatility in the cx-
will affect relative money supplies and, there. change rate and it is successful, the variance
fore, should affect the exchange rate as well, could be smaller with intervention, With this
- uncertainty, the test results merely are report-
Making clear predictions about the effects of .-
ed, and one can simply make judgments about intervention on the volatility of daily exchange .
-. . the effects (if any) of intervention on the van-
rate changes, however, is more difficult. Using . *
ance of daily exchange rate changes.
the variance of datly absolute changes in the ex-
change rate as our measure of volatility, it is The data for means and variances in tables 1-4
possible to argue that intervention, conceivably, divide the data into four groups: days when the
could raise or lower the variance of exchange Fed intervened alone, days when a foieign cen-
~tFor evidence on the Bundesbank’s practice of not com-
pletely sterilizing its intervention, see Neumann (1984).
“Because we are dealing with absolute changes,
variance is measured as ~zba’, where n is the number
of observations and e is the exchange rate.Table 2
Mean Changes in the Absolute Value of the Yen/S Exchange
Rate (~100)
Year X1 (n) ; (n) X3 (n) X.4 (a)
1985 15056(9) 9789(18) 19273(11) 8810(201)
1986 - 97.81 (47) - 86.14 (194)
1987 12450(6) 5688(33) 9765(37) 6332(167)
1988 7350 (4) 72 12 (17) 62.31 (16) 54.03 (204)
1989 9457 (7) 8284 (6) 103.52 (27) 51.48 (85)
All years 11782(26) 8231(121) 10467(91) 7097(851)
Test Statistics for Equality of Mean Changes (Absolute Values)
Year ~11X4 2—Xs x3—i4 x1=ii2 ;=i~3 ~
1985 2.02 050 402* 077 045 187
1986 --- 082 -- -- --
1987 246 0.58 3Q4* 221 074 2.40
1988 0.71 119 0.58 002 033 0.31
1989 204* 138 351* 023 0.21 044
All years 309 160 406* 163 049 1.75
Subscripts to Xs and null hypotheses indicate the following.
— intervention only by Federal Reserve
= intervention only by Bank of Japan
= intervention by both the Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan
= no intervention by either central bank
* statistically significant at the 5 percent level
tral bank intervened alone, days when both in- change rate in only three cases: in 198t and
tervened, and days when neither intervened. 1988, when the Federal Reserve and Bundes-
I ables 1 and 2 report means of the daily abso- bank both intervened on the same da and in
lute changes in the PM/S and yen/s exchange 1985 when the Bundesbank acted alone, the
rates, respectively, and tests for equality of two cases of significant effects when both cen-
means between tarious categories. ‘tables 3 and tral banks intervene is consistent with the no-
4 iepeat these categories for data on the van- tion that joint actions are associated with
ances of daily exchange rate movements. In all significantly larger exchange rate movement
cases, the data are based on absolute values of because they give signals about the future
daily changes because we do not know the course of monetary policy and its likely effects
specific intentions of intervention and our in- on the exchange rate. The e results also are
terest merely is in a central banks ability to consistent with the finding that coordinated in-
change the exchange rate. ter~entionshave larger effects on the exchange
rate than unilateral interventions.20
In table 1, the data show that intervention
was associated with a significant effect on the In table 2, the effects of intervention on the
magnitude of the daily change in the P 1/5 cx- yen/S exchange rate are how nt obe much
20See, for example, Dominguez (1990) or Loopesko (1984).Table 3
Variances of Absolute Changes in DM/$ Exchange Rate
‘2
Year “1 “2
1985 0.00018 0.00028 0.00220 0.00072
1986 0.00022 0.00030
1987 0.00021 0.00016 0.00028 0.00012
1988 0.00021 0.00013 0,00032 0.00009
1989 0.00011 0.00012 0.00018 0.00014
All years 0.00015 0.00019 0.00050 0 00030
F-statistics for Equality of Variances
2 ‘2 ‘2 ‘2 2 22 ‘2 ‘2 22 ‘2
Year S1=S4 82=84 S3=S4 S1=S2 S2=S3 81=83
1985 4.11 2,56’ 3.04’ 1.60 760’ 12.50’
1986 --- 1.37
1987 175 1.31 234’ 1.33 1.78 1,34
1968 2.46 1,53’ 37r 1.61 242~ 1.50
1989 1.35 1.23 1.28 110 1 57 1 72
Aliyears 1.97 16r 1.66 122 269 3.27
Subscripts to ~‘s and null hypotheses indicate the following
-~ intervention only by Federal Reserve
intervention only by Bundesbank
= intervention by both the Federal Reserve and Bundesbank
= no intervention by either central bank
- = statistically signiticant at the 5 percent level
stronger: in every year but 1988 (when inter- the largest significant average absolute daily
vention generally was limited), intervention change in the exchange rate is found in 1988:
either by the Fed alone or in concert with the 0.0143 pfennig. Based on an average value of
Bank of Japan on the same day apparently was 1.76 for the PM/S exchange rate in 1988, an
associated with significantly larger changes in average absolute change of 0.0143 pfennig sug-
the exchange rate.21 It should be noted, gests that joint intervention is associated with
however, that the significance of the Fed’s average absolute changes in the exchange rate
unilateral interventions is based on only 26 ob- that are 0.81 percent greater than the changes
servations during the entire 1985-89 sample that occur on days without intervention, Changes
period. Indeed, these tables show that the Fed of similar magnitudes are found for the yen/S
intervened infrequently during the period, rate. Overall, the economic significance of these
results appears to be small despite the occasion-
Having found statistical significance for the ef- .. .
ally high level of statistical significance.
fectiveness of intervention activities during cer-
tain periods, the potential economic significance With respect to variances of daily changes in
of these effects is the next question to be inves- the exchange rate, reported in tables 3 and 4, a
tigated. Looking, for example, at the effects of similar story carries through. For the nM/S
joint intervention by the Fed and Bundesbank, rate, most of the significant differences between
21 For more on this story and related evidence, see
Cbstfeld (1991) and Dominguez (1990).47
Table 4
Variances of Absolute Changes in Yen/S Exchange Rate
‘2 ‘2 ‘2 ‘2
Year S2 53 54
1985 7.96 2.01 6.32 1 37
1986 --- 1.41 --- 1.57
1987 246 069 1.55 0.74
1988 0.75 168 0.75 059
1989 1 58 1.47 213 0.51
All years 3.87 1 34 216 1.02
F-statistics for Equality of Variances
22 ‘2 ‘2 ‘2 ‘2 ‘2 “2 “2 ‘2 2 ‘2
Year ~1=~4 S2=S4 53=54 ~1=~2 ~2=~3 ~1=~3
1965 5.80’ 1.46 460’ 397 3.15’ 126
1986 .-- 1 11 --- --- --- -
1987 335 1.07 2.11’ 357’ 225’ 159
1988 1 28 2.87’ I 28 2.25 2.24 1.00
1989 3.0~ 2.87’ 416’ 1 08 1.45 1.35
All years 380’ i.ar 2.t2 2.88’ 161’ 179
Subscripts to ~‘s and null nypotheses indicate the ‘ollowing
5’ = intorvont!on only by Federal Reserve
= intervention only by Japan
intervention by both tie Fedoral Reserve and Japan
-- no intervent.on by either centra~bank
= stattstically significant at tile 5 percent eve’
days of no intervention and some intervention
occur when the Federal Reserve and the Bun-
desbank both act on the same day. For the
yen/S rate, however, significant differences are
found for either the Fed or Bank of Japan act-
ing unilaterally as well as for their joint actions.
Intervention in all cases, however, seems to he
associated with higher, not lower, variance of
daily exchange rate changes. Again, caution
should he exercised before attributing cause-
and-effect to these findings: an equally plausi-
ble, hut untestable, hypothesis implies that vola-
tility might have been even greater on these
days had it not been for the intervention.
CONCL USI.QNS
The world’s major central banks occasionally
intervene in foreign exchange markets to affect
the value of one currency relative to another.
Since 1985, the official reasons for these activi-
ties changed from reducing the dollar’s value to
stabilizing it within some unspecified range of
values. Because much of the related data are
confidential and the stated objectives of inter-
vention often are vague, researchers have been
limited in their ability to answer a fundamental
question: Poes intervention work?
Using data recently released by the Federal
Reserve, the answer seems to be that interven-
tion is associated with significantly larger daily
changes in the exchange i-ate when the Federal
Reserve and a foreign central bank both intei-
vene on the same day. This conclusion holds
even though changes in the relative money sup-
plies of two countries were described as the
primary factor behind a change in the exchange
rate and the Federal Reserve routinely sterilizes
its intervention, Consistent with other work on
coordinated intervention, it appears as if central
bank actions are enhanced by the announce-
merit of joint actions that send a stronger signal
to the market about the future course of mone-
tary policy and its possible effects on the ex-
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altered, thereby opening a channel through
which sterilized intervention, as conventionally
defined, can affect the exchange rate. In the
other case, domestic monetary policies that peg
a short-run interest rate will require less-than-
complete sterilization to keep interest rates un-
changed.
Consider first figure Al, which extends the
analysis of figure 2, panel B, in the text. NewFigure Al
Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention by the Federal Reserve with Effects on
German Money Supply: Fed Holds DM Deposits at the Bundesbank
Federal Reserve U.S Commerciat German Commercial
Banks (FRB) Banks (cb) Bundesbank (B) Banks (Gob)
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
DM deposits + Reserves + Reserves + DM deposits — Reserves — DM deposits
atB ofcb ofFRB ofUS.
correspondent
DM deposits Reserves bank
at Gob of Gcb
— U.S Treasury Reserves — Reserves
secunties of cb
+ U & Treasury
seounfies
entries to this original figure are shown in ital-
ics. Recall that the point of this figure originally
was to show how unsterilized intervention
would affect the exchange rate by expanding
the U.S. money supply relative to the German
money supply.
Picking up the story at this point, the Federal
Reserve could sterilize its intervention by selling
U.S. Treasury securities from its portfolio to
U.S. commercial banks. This would lead to all
four italicized entries in the balance sheets of
the Federal Reserve and U.S. commercial banks:
the Fed’s balance sheet would shrink with
declines both in its Treasury security assets and
its reserves liabilities, while commercial banks
would substitute ‘treasury securities for
ieserves in their portfolios. On net, the sale of
U.S. Treasury securities to commercial banks
and the consequent reduction in reserves will
offset the increase in reserves associated with
the initial intervention action and leave the U.S.
money supply unchanged. ‘I’hus, in the conven-
tional sense, the Fed has sterilized its interven-
tion and, again in the conventional view, the
exchange rate should be unaffected.
The figure shows, however, that if the Fed
merely holds its acquired DM as a deposit at
the Bundesbank, the Fed’s activities will have
reduced the German money supply. This is indi-
cated by the declines in the reserve liabilities of
the Bundesbank and reduction in the deposits
of German commercial banks. By reducing the
German money supply relative to the U.S.
money supply, the Fed’s actions should lead to
an increased nM/s exchange rate even though
the intervention was “sterilized” in the United
States.
Holding DM deposits at the Bundesbank,
however, would be somewhat unusual for the
Fed; typically, it invests its non-interest-earning
riM deposits in interest-earning DM-denominated
securities. In this more usual case, the Fed’s
“sterilized” intervention will not affect the Ger-
man money supply if it buys German bonds in
the open market. If it were to buy them direct-
ly from the Bundeshank, however, the German
money supply still would be reduced as in the
earlier example.
To see the mechanics of this effect, consider
figure A2. This is a reproduction of figure Al,
supplemented by additional transactions shown
in italics, Picking up at the point where figure
Al ended—the Fed has sterilized its intervention
and is holding a 1DM deposit at the Bundesbank—
the Fed now buys German bonds in the open
market from German commercial banks. When
the Fed’s transaction is complete, its 1DM
deposits at the Bundeshank fall, the bond hold-
ings of German commercial banks fall and the
reserves of the German banking system rise; on
net, these machinations offset the decline in the
German money supply that would occur if the
Fed merely held its riM deposits at the Bundes-
bank, In the United States, the Fed’s actions
substitute interest-earning German bonds in its





Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities





















deposits and leave the U.S. money stock un-
affected. Thus, in the case in which the Fed
eventually holds German bonds purchased in
the open market, its intervention is sterilized in
the sense of causing no change in the ratio of
German to U.S. money supplies.
Before considering the last case, in which the
Fed buys German bonds directly from the Bun-
desbank, we need to ask whether’ this interven-
tion really is sterilized in the sense that it
should produce no effect on the exchange rate.
Although relative money supplies are unaffect-
ed, the relative bond holdings of the central
banks and the public have been altered and
these portfolio substitutions can affect U.S. and
German interest rates. In the U.S. market, for
example, the Fed has induced U.S. banks to in-
crease their holdings of U.S. Treasury securities;
presumably, it did so by bidding ‘treasury
prices down, thus raising U.S. interest rates.
Conversely, it bought German bonds, pr’esuma-
bly raising their prices and lowering German in-
terest rates. Other things the same, these
changes in interest rates should make capital
flow into the United States and raise the dollar’s
value against the riM. Thus, an intervention
that was designed to reduce the dollar’s value
tends to raise it because of these interest rate
effects—even if the U.S. and German monetary
bases are unchanged.2 In addition to showing
that it is possible for <‘sterilized” intervention to
affect the exchange rate, this example also
shows the effect to be in the opposite direction
from the intent of the intervention. As a practi-
cal matter, these interest rate effects are likely
to be small, hut it is worth noting their exis-
tence as a possible channel for exchange rate
effects from sterilized intervention.
Finally, consider the consequences of the Fed
using its CM deposits at the Bundesbank to pur-
chase German bonds directly from the Bundes-
bank, This case, shown in figure AS, has the
2The story actually is more complicated. First, to the extent
that the Fed’s initial (pre-sterilization) reserves injection is
associated with a “liquidity effect,” the subsequent rise in
U.S. interest rates discussed at the end of this story may
lust offset the earlier interest rate decline and leave U.S.
interest rates, on net, at their initial levels.
It also is not possible to isolate whether intervention of
this sort will have effects on the spot or forward exchange
rate. With covered interest parity, the dollar’s forward
premium will be reduced through a rise in the dollar’s spot
rate (as discussed in the example), a decline in the for-
ward rate, or both. If there is no signaling effect, the bulk
of the change will likely occur in the spot rate. Conversely,
a strong signaling effect would likely affect the forward
rate while having little effect on the spot rate. Whichever
case prevails, the effects on the dollar’s value are unlikely
to coincide with the intent of the intervention.
Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention by the Federal Reserve without Effects













Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention by the Federal Reserve with Effects on
German Money Supply: Purchase of German Bonds from the Bundesbank
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Bundesbank exchanging German government before, the exchange rate would be expected to
bonds for its CM deposit liabilities to the Fed. change because the ratio of U.S. to German
This exchange, howexer, leaves in place the money upplies will be affected The upshot of
decline in deposit and reserves at German com- these three cases is that what is typically called
mercial banks originally shown in figure Al “sterilized” intervention has a variety of chan-
and, hence, the German money stock also nels through which the exchange rate could be
decline as it did in that first example. And, as affected.